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Employee Injury Cases: Should Courts or
Boards Decide Whether Workers'
Compensation Laws Apply?
In virtually all jurisdictions, workers' compensation laws pro-
vide the exclusive remedy for employees injured in the course of
employment.1 Under these laws the power to grant an initial deci-
sion in workers' compensation cases is removed from common law
courts and lodged instead in workers' compensation boards.2 Com-
pensation boards find facts, apply workers' compensation law to
those facts, and calculate employee awards. Ultimately, board deci-
sions are subject to de novo judicial review as to issues of law and
"substantial evidence" review as to issues of fact.3
These boards differ in several important respects from com-
mon law courts. First, findings of fact are made by administrative
officers instead of judges and juries; second, the common law de-
fenses of fellow servant, assumption of risk, and contributory negli-
1 See 1 ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 1 (1984 & Supp. 1985).
Workers' compensation laws were enacted in response to rising numbers of employee inju-
ries and deaths in the nineteenth century and dissatisfaction with the common law remedies
available to employees. See id. § 5.20; see also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAWS, COMPENDIUM ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 11-18 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as COMPENDIUM]. But see Rhodes, The Inception of Workmen's Compensation in the
United States, 11 ME. L. REV. 35 (1917) (suggesting that workers' compensation laws were
motivated by employers' perceptions of excessive tort litigation). When workers' compensa-
tion statutes were enacted, empirical data was already available suggesting that there were
defects in the common law compensation system. See CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK-ACCIDENTS
AND THE LAW (1910). Before 1910, no more than 15% of injured employees ever recovered
damages under common law causes of action, although 70% of the injuries were related to
working conditions or employers' negligence. COMPENDIUM, supra, at 11.
2 In this comment, for the sake of consistency, the special forums created by statute to
hear workers' compensation dlaims will be identified as "boards" or "compensation boards,"
even though their names vary in different states.
3 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 5952 (West 1971). The "substantial evidence" standard for
reviewing facts found by the board has often been developed in the case law without being
formally codified. See, e.g., Editorial Am. S.A. v. Kent, 421 So. 2d 612 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Hill v. Thompson, 61 N.Y.2d 1018, 463 N.E.2d 1225, 475 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1984). In
some states the standard may be even more deferential, though in practice it is likely to be
similar. See McKay Plating Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 IlM. 2d 198, 437 N.E.2d 617 (1982)
(board's factual determination-will not be disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight
of the evidence); State ex rel. Griffin v. Industrial Comm'n, 70 Ohio St. 2d 264, 436 N.E.2d
1039 (1982) (per curiam) (court will not disturb board's findings on appeal where there is
some evidence to support them).
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gence are eliminated;4 third, workers' damages in compensation ac-
tions are subject to statutory limits;6 fourth, the rules of evidence
and procedure are relaxed;6 and fifth, the employee need not show
employer negligence to recover.' These changes have led courts
and commentators to characterize workers' compensation systems
as a compromise between the interests of employer and em-
ployee-the employee relinquishes his right to bring a tort action
in return for a "certain and speedy" recovery."
4 See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 1.10. The fellow-servant rule, which first appeared in
the English case of Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (1837), precluded
recovery against an employer when the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow em-
ployee. Under the assumption of risk doctrine, employees were deemed to have assumed the
risk of any accidents resulting from hazards normally incident to their employment and
therefore were unable to recover against the employer. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R KFTON
& D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 570-72 (5th ed. 1984). Under con-
tributory negligence, employees who contributed through their negligence to their own acci-
dents and injuries could not recover from the employer even if the employer's negligence
was a greater contributing factor to the accident. Id. at 569.
See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 1.10.
' See 3 id. § 77A.10.
7See 1 id. § 1.10. All 50 states as well as the District of Columbia have enacted work-
ers' compensation laws that contain similar basic features. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3201-
6148 (West 1971 & Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138.1-.30 (Smith-Hurd 1969 &
Supp. 1985); N.Y. WORK. COMp. LAW §§ 1 to 401 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1986); OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 4123.01-.99 (Page 1953 & Supp. 1984). For a complete list and summary of
state workers' compensation laws, see DIVISION OF STATE WORKERS' COMPENSATION PRO-
GRAMS, OFFICE OF STATE LIAISON AND LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS, EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMIN-
ISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, STATE WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAWS (1971).
' New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917); see Note, New Policies
Bearing on the Negligent Employer's Immunity from Loss-Sharing, 29 ME L. REv. 243,
246-67 (1978); see also Hopkins, Executive Officer Suits Under the Combination Casualty
Policy, 25 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 169, 170 (1975) (workers' compensation laws were a compro-
mise, trading acceptance of a fixed measure of relief for waiver of necessity to prove em-
ployer negligence); Project, New York Workmen's Compensation Law: Problems and Per-
spectives, 26 BUFFALO L. REV. 637, 643 (1977) ("'Workmen's compensation thus provides
partial compensation to all those injured at the expense of those who would be able to
recover their entire losses in common law tort actions. This tradeoff is advantageous to
workers in general because of a reduction in the expenses of court trials and proceedings.' ")
(quoting NEW YORK COMMISSION ON EMPLOYERS' LIABLrrY, FIRST REPORT 19-36 (1911)) (em-
phasis in original). But cf. NICHOLAS ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE-OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASE AND INJURY 389 (1976) (suggesting that the first American workers' compensation
laws were actually an attempt to limit the amount of awards in increasingly successful tort
actions by employees during the last quarter of the nineteenth century). See generally
Friedman & Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 50, 69-72 (1967) (discussing the enactment of workers' compensation statutes). Many
commentators view the "compromise" issue in economic terms. See, e.g., 13 WEx MALONE,
LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 32 (1951) (employer expected to
pass accident costs on to consumers).
Considerable litigation regarding questions of workers' compensation coverage and ben-
efits still occurs, notwithstanding the equitable attractiveness of the "compromise." See
LOIS MACDONALD, CONTROVERTED CASES-NEw YORK STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 13
The University of Chicago Law Review
But even the most comprehensive workers' compensation sys-
tems do not cover all accidents and causes of action that have
some connection with the employer-employee relationship. If the
accident occurs while the employee is acting outside the "course of
employment," a claim for compensation is beyond the jurisdiction
of a workers' compensation board. In that instance, traditional tort
remedies remain available. Whether an accident is covered by
workers' compensation law or tort law is very important to employ-
ers and employees, since that determination controls both the sub-
stantive rules of liability and the procedure by which a claim will
be resolved.
Although employees have long attempted to avoid workers'
compensation systems in order to secure greater recoveries in tort,9
these efforts have increased as the disparity between statutory
awards and tort awards has widened. This comment addresses a
question that arises directly from efforts to avoid the workers'
compensation system: should courts or boards resolve the jurisdic-
tional issue of whether tort law or workers' compensation law ap-
plies to a particular case? The jurisdictional issue arises whenever
an employee files a tort suit in court and the employer's challenge
to the court's jurisdiction raises disputed issues of fact. The ques-
tion of who is to decide what law applies is important because its
resolution often determines whether a common law jury or a spe-
cialized board will find the facts that ultimately control the juris-
n.13 (1964) (about 5% to 10% of New York cases are controverted); Brodie, The Adequacy
of Workmen's Compensation as Social Insurance: A Review of Developments and Propos-
als, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 57, 63-73 (primary areas of litigation have been existence of employ-
ment relationship and causation). See generally REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 99-100 (1973) (discussing amount of litigation)
[hereinafter cited as NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT].
Recent tort law developments favorable to plaintiffs have led some commentators to
suggest that the compromise struck by workers' compensation legislation may no longer be
valid. See, e.g., Project, supra, at 645-46, 651-52 (suggesting that changes in tort law since
the beginning of this century have increased the probability that employees will recover in
tort actions, thus disturbing the balance struck by the workers' compensation statutes); see
also N. ASHFORD, supra, at 398-422 (criticizing workers' compensation as not providing in-
centive to reduce hazards).
9 Workers' compensation benefits are very meager in comparison to current personal
injury awards. See Comment, Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court: The Not-
So-Exclusive Remedy Rule, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 263, 268 n.32 (1981) (citing several recent large
tort judgments for amounts greatly in excess of actual damages); cf. Hopkins, supra note 8,
at 172 ("Although employers had contested the passage by legislatures of the compensation
acts because of the projected cost factor, this turned out not (necessarily) to be the case. In
actuality, the protection of employers from very large tort suits far outweighed any actual
expenses that the employers had to pay in compensation benefits.").
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dictional inquiry.10
Part I examines three approaches that courts have adopted for
deciding which tribunal has "jurisdiction to determine jurisdic-
tion" in potential workers' compensation actions. The first ap-
proach, followed by a majority of jurisdictions that have consid-
ered the question, allows the tribunal first hearing the claim to
decide the jurisdictional question. The second approach divides
the jurisdictional question, giving the court power to determine
"fundamental" issues such as whether the defendant is the plain-
tiffs employer, and giving the board the power to decide whether
an injury occurred in the course of employment. The third ap-
proach requires that a court defer to the board if there is a "sub-
stantial question" as to whether a particular injury occurred in the
course of employment. Part II demonstrates the inadequacies of
each of these approaches to the problem. Part III draws on the
administrative law doctrine of primary jurisdiction to conclude
that the jurisdictional question should be decided by the board
whenever either party to the action petitions the board to make
that determination.
I. CURRENT RESPONSES TO THE JURISDICTION QUESTION
The foundation of every workers' compensation scheme is its
coverage provision. Most state statutes provide that workers' com-
pensation laws apply whenever an injury arises out of and occurs
in the course of employment." While some courts have compli-
10 Because the jurisdictional inquiry turns on disputed factual questions, the court's
determination will often be made by a jury. See, e.g., Scott v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
46 Cal. 2d 76, 84, 293 P.2d 18, 23 (1956) (special interrogatory appropriate for jury to deter-
mine statutory coverage); Sewell v. Clearing Mach. Corp., 419 Mich. 56, 62, 347 N.W.2d 447,
450 (1984) (judge and jury to determine whether plaintiff is an employee of defendant);
O'Rourke v. Long, 41 N.Y.2d 219, 226, 359 N.E.2d 1347, 1353, 391 N.Y.S.2d 553, 559 (1976)
(jury may decide plaintiff's status as employee). Common law judges may control the juris-
dictional question in some cases, such as where the issue is presented on a motion for di-
rected verdict or a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Lamar v. Ford Motor Co., 409 S.W.2d 100
(Mo. 1966).
" Forty-two states have adopted the "arising out of and in the course of employment"
language. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 6.10. As to the more general "course of employment"
concept, 47 states use this phrase. Id. The "arising out of" portion has been thought to refer
to causal origin, whereas the "course of employment" language is construed to relate to the
time, place, and circumstances of the accident in relation to the employment. Some courts
have held that each test must be independently applied and met. See, e.g., Martin v. Uni-
fied School Dist. No. 233, 5 Kan. App. 2d 298, 299, 615 P.2d 168, 169-70 (1980). However,
Larson urges that the basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is
best expressed in the term "work connection." 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 6.10; cf. Brodie,
supra note 8, at 63-64 (determining the existence of the relationship of employment is "one
of the most puzzling problems before English and American courts").
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cated this inquiry by construing the statutory language narrowly12
or by creating exceptions to the exclusive nature of workers' com-
pensation laws, 13 in the vast majority of cases jurisdiction turns on
the resolution of two related factual inquiries: (1) whether an em-
ployer-employee relationship existed at the time of the injury; and
(2) whether the injury occurred in the course of employment. If a
court has the power to determine jurisdiction, these factual issues
will often be resolved by a jury; if a board has the power to deter-
mine jurisdiction, these factual issues will be resolved by adminis-
trative officers appointed by the state."4
12 Courts have read the "in the course of employment" inquiry narrowly through their
use of the so-called "dual capacity" doctrine. See, e.g., Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist.,
77 ill. 2d 313, 318-19, 396 N.E.2d 524, 527 (1979). Under this doctrine, an employer may be
liable in tort for an injury proximately caused by the employer's breach of a duty arising
from a legal persona separate and distinct from his status as an employer. 2A A. LARSON,
supra note 1, § 72.81. Courts typically apply the dual capacity doctrine where the employee
is injured in the course of his employment, but the injury is caused by a defective product
manufactured by the employer. In such a case, the court may hold that the employee has a
tort action against the employer because the employer's liability to users created by the
introduction of a product into commerce is separate and distinct from the employer's duty
as an employer. See, e.g., Mercer v. Uniroyal Inc., 49 Ohio App. 2d 279, 282, 361 N.E.2d 492,
496 (1976) (hazard must be "common to the public in general"); see also McCormick v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill. 2d 352, 423 N.E.2d 876 (1981); Panagos v. North Detroit Gen.
Hosp., 35 Mich. App. 554, 192 N.W.2d 542 (1971).
Until recently, California courts had applied the dual capacity doctrine most exten-
sively. See, e.g., Bell v. Industrial Vangas Inc., 30 Cal. 3d 268, 274-76, 637 P.2d 266, 269-71,
179 Cal. Rptr. 30, 33-35 (1981) (citing cases). The California legislature, however, essentially
eliminated the dual capacity doctrine by statutory amendment in 1982. See CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 3602(a) (West Supp. 1986); see also Siva v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Cal. App. 3d
152, 156 n.6, 194 Cal. Rptr. 51, 53 n.6 (1983).
13 See, e.g., Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 612-
13, 433 N.E.2d 572, 576 (if an employer acts intentionally, an employee can bring action in
tort even though the workers' compensation statute provided that the employer "shall not
be liable to respond in damages at common law or by statute for any injury ... received or
contracted by an employee in the course of ... employment") (quoting OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 4123.74 (Page 1953 & Supp. 1984)) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857
(1982); Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165
Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980) (employee can maintain suit for injuries caused by fraudulent conceal-
ment of disease and its cause) (decision subsequently overruled by legislation, see supra
note 11); cf. Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 161 W. Va. 695, 706, 246 S.E.2d 907, 914
(1978) (construing statutory exception for intentional torts to apply to "willful, wanton, and
reckless misconduct").
", Because the factual findings of the board are subject to a very deferential standard
of review-the "substantial evidence" standard, see supra note 3-and because the "juris-
dictional facts" doctrine has been largely rejected in the workers' compensation context, the
boards' decisions as to facts bearing on jurisdiction are essentially final. The jurisdictional
fact doctrine held that board findings were not conclusive when they related to the facts on
which the jurisdiction of the board depended in the first place. See Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22, 58-62 (1932); Walker v. United States Gypsum Co., 270 F.2d 857, 859 n.4 (4th Cir.
1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 805 (1960); Downham v. Wagner, 408 N.E.2d 606 (Ind. Ct. App.
1980). The rationale for the doctrine was that allowing the board to make conclusive deter-
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In most instances, a plaintiff would prefer to have disputed
questions of fact resolved by a jury because jurors are more likely
to be sympathetic to an injured worker. Employers, on the other
hand, would prefer disputed factual issues to be resolved by spe-
cialized administrative officers, who deal with injured plaintiffs on
a regular basis and are thus less likely to be swayed by sympathy
in a particular case. These intuitions about the behavior of em-
ployers and employees are borne out in the cases. An injured em-
ployee typically brings a claim in court; just as typically, the em-
ployer seeks to dismiss the court action by arguing that the issue of
jurisdiction should properly be resolved by the board.15
Faced with these conflicting tendencies of employers and em-
ployees, courts have taken a variety of positions on the issue of
"jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction." The three dominant re-
sponses are presented here.
A. The Majority Approach
The majority of jurisdictions that have considered the jurisdic-
tional question have ruled that the court and the board have con-
current jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction.16 Under the majority
approach, the first tribunal to secure jurisdiction over the contro-
versy decides whether workers' compensation laws apply. After
that decision is made, jurisdiction becomes exclusive in the tribu-
nal that was found to be appropriate. For example, assume that a
factory worker slips on an ice patch and breaks his leg while walk-
ing to work on a factory-owned sidewalk. He files a tort action
against his employer in a court of general jurisdiction. The court
minations about the facts on which its jurisdiction rested would enable the board to enlarge
its statutorily defined power by its own act. See 3 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 80.41. The
rejection of the doctrine, however, has been based not on a desire to pay greater deference
to compensation boards, but on the awareness that any fact-finding by a board-whether it
is a finding as to employment relation, timely filing of claim, or injury in the course of
employment-bears in some way on its jurisdiction. Most courts have therefore discarded
the doctrine and apply substantial evidence review to all fact determinations by boards. Id.
5 See, e.g., Scott v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 46 Cal. 2d 76, 293 P.2d 18 (1956);
Sewell v. Clearing Mach. Corp., 419 Mich. 56, 347 N.W.2d 447 (1984).
14 The majority approach has been adopted in California, Delaware, Idaho, New Jersey,
Oklahoma, and South Dakota. See Yavitch v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 142 Cal.
App. 3d 64, 190 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1983); Ward v. General Motors Corp., 431 A.2d 1277 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1981); Anderson v. Galley, 97 Idaho 813, 555 P.2d 144 (1976); Singer Shop-Rite,
Inc. v. Rangel, 174 N.J. Super. 442, 416 A.2d 965 (App. Div. 1980); Jones Drilling Co. v.
Woodson, 509 P.2d 116 (Okla. 1973); South Dakota Medical Serv. v. Minnesota Mut. Fire &
Casualty Co., 303 N.W.2d 358 (S.D. 1981); cf. Bjerke v. Heartso, 183 N.W.2d 496 (N.D.
1971) (court is free to decide questions that would normally be referred to the board if the
board has lost jurisdiction through lapse of time).
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makes a factual determination that jurisdiction for this suit prop-
erly lies with the board, not the court. As soon as this determina-
tion is made, the worker's only option is to pursue his claim before
the board.
The majority rule was laid down by the California Supreme
Court in Scott v. Industrial Accident Commission.17 In Scott, the
plaintiff was injured while he was an invitee on company premises,
and filed an action in state court to recover for his injuries.1 8 The
company argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because the
board had exclusive jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim. The
company then instructed its workers' compensation insurer to file
an application with the board for adjustment of a claim arising
from the same injuries that the plaintiff had alleged in the court
action. After rejecting the plaintiff's request for a stay of the pro-
ceedings, the board began its hearings."' The court then faced the
question of whether to stay the board proceedings pending the
court's resolution of the jurisdictional issue.
Stating that "[w]hen two or more tribunals in this state have
concurrent jurisdiction, the tribunal first assuming jurisdiction re-
tains it to the exclusion of all other tribunals in which the action
might have been initiated," the Scott court ordered a stay of the
proceedings before the board.20 In the court's view, the first tribu-
nal to take jurisdiction may prohibit another tribunal from trying
to proceed, even though the second tribunal might already have
assumed jurisdiction.2
In rendering its judgment, the court made it clear that the sole
point of concurrent jurisdiction between the board and the court
was "jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction." Thus, only the deter-
mination on the matter of coverage would be res judicata in pro-
ceedings before another tribunal that involved the same parties or
46 Cal. 2d 76, 293 P.2d 18 (1956).
18 Id. at 79, 293 P.2d at 20. The plaintiff was 19 years old, and brought the action
through a guardian ad litem.
19 Id. at 79-80, 293 P.2d at 20. Apparently the plaintiff believed he would be successful
in his tort action and, further, that the court would be more likely than the compensation
board to find that jurisdiction of his case lay with the court rather than with the board.
20 Id. at 81, 293 P.2d at 21.
21 Prohibition is a legal remedy that affords relief similar to that obtained from an
injunction granted by a court of equity against proceedings at law. See FORREST G. FERRIS,
THE LAW OF EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES 312-461 (1926). The writ of prohibition pro-
vides an original remedy against encroachment of jurisdiction by restraining subordinate
courts and inferior judicial tribunals from exceeding their jurisdiction. Such a writ may is-
sue to an administrative agency acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity. See, e.g., Peo-
ple ex rel. Hurley v. Graber, 405 IM. 331, 90 N.E.2d 763 (1950); Carpentertown Coal & Coke
Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 61 A.2d 426 (1946).
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those privy to them.22 The court gave two reasons for limiting con-
current jurisdiction to the issue of jurisdiction: first, such a rule
avoids conflicts between boards and courts that might arise if both
were free to make contradictory awards relating to the same
claims; second, the rule protects litigants from the expense and
harassment of multiple litigation.23
Under the majority approach, as the Scott court expressly ac-
knowledged, the litigants are placed in a "footrace" to the tribunal
of their choice.2" An employee is free to file an action in court.
Similarly, an employer or insurance carrier may file an application
to adjust a claim with the board immediately upon the occurrence
of an injury, which may be before or during the furnishing of medi-
cal care or compensation payments.25 But the party that acts first
determines which tribunal will resolve the jurisdictional issue.
B. The "Split-Jurisdiction" Approach
Whereas the majority approach gives a court power to deter-
mine whether a claim is covered by the workers' compensation
laws when the court's jurisdiction is invoked prior to that of the
board, Michigan case law gives a court the power to decide one
aspect of that overall determination but not another. Under Michi-
gan's approach, a court may decide whether a defendant is the
plaintiff's employer, but lacks the power to determine whether an
injury occurred in the course of employment.26
22 Scott, 46 Cal. 2d at 83, 293 P.2d at 22. Although the cases are not entirely clear on
this point, the Scott court states what seems the better view-that a determination of the
jurisdictional issue on the facts by either a court or a board should bind the other tribunal.
See also supra note 14. But cf. O'Rourke v. Long, 41 N.Y.2d 219, 227, 359 N.E.2d 1347,
1354, 391 N.Y.S.2d 553, 559 (1976) ("an adjudication by the board that there was a relation-
ship between accident and employment, unless reversed on a direct appeal, would preclude
any recovery in a civil action against the employer," but the reverse may not be true).
2S 46 Cal.2d at 82, 293 P.2d at 21.
2' Id. at 89, 293 P.2d at 25.
25 Id. at 86, 293 P.2d at 24.
2 See Sewell v. Clearing Mach. Corp., 419 Mich. 56, 347 N.W.2d 447 (1984). The Mich-
igan approach has not been expressly adopted elsewhere. While some Missouri cases have
stressed the board's exclusive jurisdiction over employment-related injuries, see, e.g.,
Hannah v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Mo. 1982) (" 'We find no Missouri case
holding that the courts have such concurrent jurisdiction but find many to the effect that
the Commission has exclusive and original jurisdiction.' ") (quoting Sheen v. Dibella, 395
S.W.2d 296, 303 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965)), two other Missouri cases indicate that a court pos-
sesses some jurisdiction, thereby suggesting that Missouri is aligned with the split-jurisdic-
tion approach, see Lamar v. Ford Motor Co., 409 S.W.2d 100, 107 (Mo. 1966) (circuit court
had jurisdiction to determine whether plaintiff was an employee of the employer); Zahn v.
Associated Dry Goods Co., 655 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (upholding trial court's
discretion to decide that for purposes of determining compensation, employment includes
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In Sewell v. Clearing Machine Corp.,27 the plaintiff, an em-
ployee of Bathey Manufacturing Company, was seriously injured in
an industrial accident. After filing a tort action in state court, the
plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding Armco Steel Corpora-
tion as a defendant. The plaintiff alleged that Armco had assumed
control of the safety program at Bathey, and that Armco agents
and employees operated the Bathey manufacturing plant for the
profit of Armco. In response, Armco contended that it actually was
the plaintiff's employer and therefore the plaintiff's exclusive rem-
edy against it was to seek workers' compensation benefits. Armco
later asserted further that the board had exclusive jurisdiction to
decide the issue of fact concerning the identity of the plaintiff's
employer.28
The Sewell court conceded that the board had exclusive juris-
diction to decide whether injuries suffered by an employee oc-
curred in the course of employment. Nonetheless, the court found
that it retained the power to decide "the more fundamental issue"
of whether the plaintiff was an employer or a fellow employee of
the defendant.29
Under such a split-jurisdiction approach, therefore, courts and
boards each have power to decide distinct aspects of the jurisdic-
tional inquiry. Courts may determine employee status-as well as
other "fundamental issues"-and boards have exclusive jurisdic-
tion to determine whether the injury occurred in the course of
employment.
C. The "Substantial Question" Approach
The approach adopted by New York and several other juris-
dictions requires a court to defer to the board on the jurisdictional
issue if there is a "substantial question" as to whether a particular
injury occurred in the course of employment.3 0 Under the substan-
activities reasonably necessary in passing to and from workplace). Thus Missouri law is un-
settled in this area.
27 419 Mich. 56, 347 N.W.2d 447 (1984).
28 Id. at 58-59, 347 N.W.2d at 448.
29 Id. at 62, 347 N.W.2d at 450.
o See, e.g., Botwinick v. Ogden, 59 N.Y.2d 909, 453 N.E.2d 520, 466 N.Y.S.2d 291
(1983) (mem.); O'Rourke v. Long, 41 N.Y.2d 219, 359 N.E.2d 1347, 391 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1976).
Texas, the District of Columbia, and the federal system (for cases arguably falling under the
exclusivity provision of the Federal Employee Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c) (Supp.
1985)) are the other jurisdictions which follow the substantial question approach. See Har-
rington v. Moss, 407 A.2d 658 (D.C. 1979); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Christensen,
223 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 149 Tex. 79, 228 S.W.2d 135
(1950); Hudiburgh v. United States, 626 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1980); Reep v. United States,
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tial question approach, jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction rests
primarily with the board. Only if there is no "substantial ques-
tion"-that is, if a court views all factual questions as settled in a
given action-can a court make the "pure law" determination of
which law applies.
A New York case, O'Rourke v. Long,31 provides the clearest
statement of this rule. In O'Rourke, the plaintiff, a ten-year-old
boy, had been employed illegally as a newspaper delivery boy. Af-
ter flagging down an ice cream truck and crossing the street to buy
ice cream, the plaintiff was struck and injured by a vehicle as he
returned to his bicycle.2
A few months after the accident, the plaintiff filed a state tort
action naming the newspaper as defendant. The trial court dis-
missed the action. In upholding the dismissal, the New York Court
of Appeals held that where the jurisdiction of the board hinged
upon the resolution either of purely factual questions or of mixed
questions of fact and law, the plaintiff may not choose the courts
as the forum for the resolution of such questions. Instead, the re-
sponsibility for deciding such "substantial questions" is lodged in
the board.3
II. INADEQUACIES OF THE CONTEMPORARY RESPONSES
Each of the contemporary approaches inadequately resolves
the jurisdictional question. To an extent, this stems from the
courts' failure to recognize the goal of workers' compensation law:
providing a "certain and speedy" mechanism for resolving the
claims of injured workers. 4 The strengths and weaknesses of each
approach are set out below.
557 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1977); Bailey v. United States, 451 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1971); Daniels-
Lumley v. United States, 306 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Somma v. United States, 283 F.2d
149 (3d Cir. 1960).
-- 41 N.Y.2d 219, 359 N.E.2d 1347, 391 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1976).
:2 Id. at 220, 359 N.E.2d at 1349, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 555.
13 Id. at 228, 353 N.E.2d at 1354, 391 N.Y.S.2d at 560. O'Rourke's distinction between
questions of fact and mixed questions of fact and law merely restates the "substantial ques-
tion" test: under the latter test a court will determine whether there is a "substantial ques-
tion," which would necessitate an administrative determination; under the O'Rourke test a
court will determine whether a particular issue is a "pure law" issue, the determination of
which would not require the assistance of another tribunal.
" See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
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A. The Majority Approach
The majority approach 35 is subject to three criticisms: it
causes an unnecessary race to the courthouse by litigants; it leads
to duplicative litigation; and it creates the possibility of
nonuniform results. For these reasons, the majority approach is in-
consistent with the goal of providing a "certain and speedy" mech-
anism for resolving the claims of injured workers.
Because the first party to file has the power to select the deci-
sionmaker on the jurisdictional question, the majority approach
leads to a "footrace to filing" between the litigants. Recognizing
this, the Scott court argued that alternative approaches posed even
greater difficulties: for instance, if jurisdiction were to depend on
the first final judgment rather than the first filing, "then we should
still have the footrace but it would be a marathon rather than a
sprint." 6 This response may be correct, but it fails to explain why
there should be any footrace at all. If either tribunal is given the
exclusive power to decide the jurisdictional issue, there would be
no race.
Not only is the arbitrariness of a footrace difficult to justify,
but in practice that footrace has proven to be longer than the
hoped-for sprint. As a consequence the majority approach has led
to duplicative litigation. Two California cases illustrate this point.
In Busick v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board,3 7 the
plaintiff, a bookkeeper for a small trucking company, was on vaca-
tion to reconsider her decision to leave the company. While on her
"vacation," the plaintiff and a co-worker opened up a competing
trucking business, acquiring some of her employer's customers.
When the plaintiff went to her employer's establishment to pick up
her final payroll checks, one of her employers shot her and then
killed himself.38
The plaintiff first filed a claim with the compensation board,
arguing that she had sustained an injury arising out of and in the
course of her employment with her former employer. More than
six months later, however, the plaintiff commenced a civil action
for damages against her former employer's executrix to recover
damages for assault and battery.39 The state court entered a judg-
11 See supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
38 46 Cal. 2d at 88-89, 293 P.2d at 25.
37 7 Cal. 3d 967, 500 P.2d 1386, 104 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1972).
38 Id. at 970-71, 500 P.2d at 1389, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
3 Id. Plaintiff's inconsistent actions in the two tribunals may have been an attempt to
preserve her remedies in both forums against the running of the statute of limitations. A
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ment in the plaintiff's favor for tort damages. In the subsequent
workers' compensation proceeding, the board found that the plain-
tiff's injury did not arise out of and occur in the course of her
employment.4 °
Despite the fact that she had secured a large recovery in the
civil action, the plaintiff appealed the board's decision. 41 The re-
viewing court, however, agreed with the defendant's contention
that the state court judgment precluded recovery before the board,
since the state court was the first tribunal to reach a final judg-
ment on the plaintiff's claim. 42 The court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that because she filed her claim with the board before
she brought her civil action for damages, the state court should
have stayed the action on its own motion pending the board's de-
termination of whether the injury was employment-related. The
court quoted the Scott court's "first to obtain jurisdiction" test,
but pointed out that a party may obtain an order preventing the
second tribunal from acting, pending determination by the first tri-
bunal of the jurisdictional question. If both parties fail to do so,
the court is free to proceed.43 Since the court is not obliged to
await the first tribunal's action, the potential for simultaneous liti-
gation in two tribunals remains.
The majority approach also led to duplicative litigation in Sea
World Corp. v. Superior Court.4 In Sea World, the plaintiff, a sec-
retary, was injured after having "bestridden" a killer whale owned
by her employer, an action she took at her supervisor's request.
The plaintiff filed actions on the same day with the court and the
board. In her application to the board, she stated that her injury
arose out of and in the course of her employment by Sea World. In
her court complaint, however, she alleged that she was not acting
within the scope of her employment when she was injured.
The board obtained jurisdiction over Sea World through ser-
more likely scenario, however, is that after having filed with the compensation board, plain-
tiff received advice from counsel to pursue the potentially more lucrative award available in
a common law court.
40 Id. at 972, 500 P.2d at 1390, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
4, The plaintiff's desire to pursue her claim heard before the board may have stemmed
from the discovery that she had sued a judgment-proof defendant. Although the trial court
entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for a one-half "joint share" of $500,000 general
damages and $150,000 punitive damages, the court expressly noted that the record did not
disclose what part, if any, of this judgment had been satisfied. Id. at 971 n.5, 500 P.2d at
1389 n.5, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 45 n.5.
"' Id. at 977, 500 P.2d at 1393, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
43 Id. at 976, 500 P.2d at 1393, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
4 34 Cal. App. 3d 494, 110 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1973).
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vice of process by mail four days before the court obtained juris-
diction by personal service. Sea World sought a writ of prohibition
from an appellate court to restrain further proceedings in the ac-
tion pending before the original court. Sea World contended that
the board had priority to determine the jurisdictional issue be-
cause it was the first tribunal to obtain jurisdiction over the
parties.4 5
In denying Sea World's request for a writ of prohibition, the
court purported to adopt "the rationale and historical perspective
of Scott," in addition to looking to "other rules long and widely
recognized as governing tribunals whose jurisdiction is generally
concurrent. '46 One of those rules, the court said, is that the tribu-
nal where jurisdiction first attached may either insist upon or
waive its jurisdiction.47 Thus, the board has discretion to refuse to
exercise jurisdiction where a court with concurrent jurisdiction has
undertaken to exercise jurisdiction over the same subject matter.
Furthermore, because this case involved only jurisdiction to deter-
mine jurisdiction, as opposed to exclusive subject matter jurisdic-
tion, a litigant may waive, or be estopped from asserting, lack of
jurisdiction.48 When Sea World moved for summary judgment in
the superior court, it waived the board's priority of jurisdiction.
Thus, the Scott court's contention that its approach would
lead to a sprint rather than a marathon does not hold true where,
as in Busick, a plaintiff decides to pursue remedies in both tribu-
nals without obtaining an order staying the second tribunal's pro-
ceedings. In fact, although the Busick court rested its decision on
res judicata principles, whereas the Sea World court cited notions
of estoppel and the discretionary power of tribunals to waive their
priority of jurisdiction, the problems engendered by the two deci-
sions are similar: in both cases there was duplicative litigation, and
in both cases the first tribunal to obtain jurisdiction ultimately did
not make the controlling determination of whether workers' com-
pensation law was applicable to the plaintiff's injury.
" Id. at 496-97, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 234. The irony of Sea World's request to the appellate
court for a writ of prohibition to restrain proceedings in the original court was that it came
only after Sea World's motion for summary judgment on the jurisdictional question had
been denied. Thus, the jurisdiction of the original court, which Sea World was now attempt-
ing to foreclose through its request to the appellate court for a writ of prohibition, had
earlier been specifically invoked by Sea World to make the jurisdictional determination on
what was claimed to be a showing of undisputed facts. It was, in short, a classic case of a
litigant attempting to get "two bites of the same apple."
46 Id. at 499, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
47 Id.
Is Id. at 501, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
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A more fundamental problem with the majority approach is
that it may lead to nonuniform decisions in employee injury cases
involving similar facts. The "footrace to file" allows some cases to
appear before a court, and others before a board. Since juries are
more likely than board officials to be sympathetic to injured plain-
tiffs in resolving factual issues that are central to the jurisdictional
question, similar cases may be held subject to different laws. To
illustrate, assume that Worker Jones sustains an injury under the
same circumstances as Worker Smith. Jones' lawyer files suit in
court immediately following his injury. In a jury trial, the court
decides that the injury was not sustained "in the course of employ-
ment" and takes jurisdiction to hear the claim. Smith, on the other
hand, is a legal novice whose employer quickly files a claim with
the board. The board decides that the injury was sustained "in the
course of employment" and retains jurisdiction to hear the claim.
Thanks to the "footrace," workers' compensation law governs
Smith's claim, while state tort law governs Jones' claim.
B. The "Split-Jurisdiction" Approach
Although the split-jurisdiction approach 9 leads to uniformity
of application, in that similar cases will be decided by the same
tribunal, it suffers from an unconvincing rationale and from lack of
clarity. The courts' rationale for the split-jurisdiction approach is
that the inquiry into the employee's status as an employee is
"more fundamental" than the inquiry into "course of employ-
ment." 50 However, the courts have given no specific reasons why
this is so. As the concurrence in Sewell pointed out, the court's
"more fundamental" test seems groundless.51
The split-jurisdiction approach can also lead to absurd results.
For example, assume that Worker has told Employer that he is
going to quit his job in two weeks. On his final scheduled workday,
Worker calls in sick but nonetheless stops in at work later that day
to pick up his final check. While picking up his check, Worker is
injured. Worker brings a tort action against Employer. According
to the split-jurisdiction approach, the court can decide whether an
41 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
'o Sewell, 419 Mich. at 62, 347 N.W.2d at 450.
51 Id. at 65, 347 N.W.2d at 454 (Levin, J., concurring); see also 3 A. LARsON, supra note
1, § 80.41 (the designation of certain facts-like employment relation-as jurisdictional
facts is "arbitrary," since the same designation could be applied just as easily to the exis-
tence of a compensable accident or to whether the injury occurred in the course of
employment).
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employer-employee relationship still existed between Worker and
Employer at the time of the injury, although it cannot decide
whether the injury occurred in the course of employment.
The problem here is readily apparent: the two ques-
tions-employee status and course of employment-are often so
intertwined that it is difficult to decide one issue without deciding
the other. If the court decides that an employer-employee relation-
ship existed between Worker and Employer at the time of the in-
jury, it seems to follow that the injury occurred in the course of
employment. Yet this latter determination, according to the Sewell
majority, is supposed to rest exclusively with the board.
Not only is the distinction between these two questions un-
principled, but it has another disturbing implication. What would
prevent a court from holding that other aspects of the jurisdic-
tional question are "more fundamental" than the course of em-
ployment issue and therefore fall within the realm of its own juris-
diction rather than that of the board? In this manner, courts could
wrest particular aspects of the jurisdictional inquiry away from the
board.
C. The "Substantial Question" Approach
The substantial question approach52 has the advantage of re-
quiring a court to defer to the board's expertise on the jurisdic-
tional issue. Yet the courts have neglected to define what consti-
tutes a "substantial question."
Several advantages would accrue to a jurisdiction that adopted
this approach in place of the majority approach. First, it promotes
uniform decisions because the factual issue of whether an injury
occurred in the course of employment is decided by the same
factfinder whenever the issue is substantially in dispute. In a juris-
diction following the majority approach, this determination is
made by the board in some unpredictable class of cases and by a
judge and jury in others.5 3 Second, with power largely vested in a
single tribunal, litigants do not need to "race" to file claims, and
there is less potential for simultaneous litigation in separate tribu-
nals.54 Whenever a plaintiff brings a suit whose facts raise a sub-
stantial factual question regarding the applicability of workers'
compensation laws, a court must stay its own action pending board
52 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
'3 See Bailey v. United States, 451 F.2d 963, 968 (5th Cir. 1971) (Clark, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
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resolution of the jurisdictional issue.55
The main flaw in the substantial question approach is similar
to that of the split-jurisdiction approach-ambiguity of terminol-
ogy. This ambiguity threatens to increase the administrative costs
of a workers' compensation system without offering much benefit
in return. So long as a court may decide that there is no "substan-
tial question" of workers' compensation coverage in a given case,
tort-minded plaintiffs have an incentive to press their common law
suits at least to the point where the court decides that there is a
substantial question of coverage and that the case must therefore
be stayed pending the board's jurisdictional determination."
Further, there is ample evidence to suggest that courts in fact
misapply the "substantial question" formula, and thereby increase
the incentive for plaintiffs to press costly civil actions. A good ex-
ample of this problem is provided by the federal case of Bailey v.
United States.57 In Bailey, the plaintiff, a government employee,
was injured when her car was struck from behind by a military
pickup truck.58 Subsequently, the plaintiff and her husband sued
in federal court for recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA).59 The government argued that the plaintiff's proper rem-
edy was first to seek recovery from the Department of Labor,
which has exclusive jurisdiction of compensation for injuries sus-
tained by a government employee "in the performance of [her]
duty."60
The district court held that there was no substantial question
as to whether the plaintiff's injury occurred in the performance of
her duties. Consequently, suit could be brought under the FTCA.
In affirming the district court's decision, the Fifth Circuit appeared
to stretch the "substantial question" doctrine in order to keep the
" See Reep v. United States, 557 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1977).
16 This incentive is absent under the proposed approach, discussed infra at notes 63-72
and accompanying text, where the mere petition by either party in the pre-trial stage to
have the jurisdictional matter decided by the compensation board will automatically have
the effect of a stay. Efforts to convince the court that there is no "substantial question" of
coverage would become obsolete.
-7 451 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1971).
58 Id. at 965.
59 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982).
40 Bailey, 451 F.2d at 964-65. The court quoted from the Federal Employees Compen-
sation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a) (Supp. 1985). The statute further provides that the
liability of the United States "is exclusive and instead of all other liability of the United
States . . . to the employee." Id. § 8116(c). The Secretary of Labor is vested with the
power to administer and decide all questions arising under the FECA, and these compensa-
tion decisions are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed by a court of law. Id.
§§ 8128(b)(1)-(2), 8145.
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determination of the jurisdictional question for itself-for there
was surely some question as to whether the employee was injured
in the course of her duties as an employee."1 As the dissent pointed
out, perhaps the crucial question was not whether a substantial
question existed, but whether the court should make the determi-
nation of substantiality.e2
III. A PROPOSED APPROACH
The conflicting interests of employers and employees in em-
ployee injury cases makes necessary a careful determination of
which tribunal should decide the jurisdictional issue. Each of the
contemporary approaches is inadequate: the majority approach
causes a footrace to file that leads to nonuniform decisions and du-
plicative litigation; the split-jurisdiction approach employs such
malleable standards that courts and boards are left in a quandary
as to which questions properly lie within their respective jurisdic-
tions; and the "substantial question" approach encourages litigants
to gamble on the likelihood of judicial error, thereby increasing the
costs of administering a workers' compensation system. The need
for a new approach seems clear.
To remedy these deficiencies, this comment proposes that the
jurisdictional inquiry be referred to the workers' compensation
board upon petition by either party to the action. Since employers
can be expected to petition for board determinations whenever
there are disputed factual issues relating to jurisdiction, as a prac-
tical matter this proposal gives boards the exclusive power to re-
solve jurisdictional facts-subject of course to substantial evidence
review. On an intuitive level this solution is attractive because it
takes full advantage of the strengths of both tribunals: courts re-
solve issues of law (through de novo review) and boards apply their
expertise to resolve issues of fact that arise in the employment
context.
This proposal avoids the problems of the current approaches.
First, it eliminates the race to file. An employee who is injured on
61 The strongest argument for deciding the jurisdictional issue on the facts-that the
employee was a block away from the premises-was not viewed by the court as dispositive.
The court rejected the government's argument that the "premises rule" should preclude
judicial determination of FECA coverage whenever a federal employee, going to or coming
from work, is injured by another federal employee while on government property. Instead,
the court deemed the location of the accident to be just one of the factors to be considered
in determining whether there is a substantial question of FECA coverage. Bailey, 451 F.2d
at 967.
62 Id. at 968 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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the job does not benefit by filing a tort action before an employer
files a claim with the board, since the employer can simply petition
to have the board decide which law governs." Second, judicial re-
sources will not be wasted through duplicative litigation. Given
that civil juries are more likely to be sympathetic to injured plain-
tiffs, employers have a powerful incentive to petition immediately
for board determination of the jurisdictional issue if a civil action
is filed. Finally, this proposal is cheaper to administer than the
"substantial question" approach. Since the new proposal simply
turns on a petition by one of the parties, the need for any judicial
determination is eliminated.6
This proposal finds theoretical support in the administrative
law doctrine of primary jurisdiction. 5 This doctrine is used to de-
termine which tribunal-the court or the administrative
agency-should take initial action. 6 The doctrine allows a court to
refer to an agency any issues within their concurrent jurisdiction
when doing so will promote uniform decisions or utilize agency
expertise.
The rationales behind the primary jurisdiction doctrine sup-
port an approach that allows boards to decide the jurisdictional
question. 7 Allowing the board to decide the jurisdictional issue
'3 In order to prevent sandbagging by either party, it would probably be necessary to
set a time limit on the ability to petition the board and obtain board determination of the
jurisdictional question.
" Nor will the compensation boards be swamped with cases. Their workloads will un-
doubtedly increase under this proposal, but the boards will not have to decide the jurisdic-
tional question in all cases. Although strategies of delay will play a part in particular cases,
employers typically will have little incentive to petition for board determination unless they
think that they have a realistic chance on the facts of convincing the board that workers'
compensation laws apply.
" The doctrine of primary jurisdiction originated in Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cot-
ton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 (1907), out of a concern for nationally uniform regulation of carrier
rates. Id. at 440. The Supreme Court held that the Interstate Commerce Commission had
original jurisdiction to entertain proceedings to determine the reasonableness of carrier
rates, since without such protection, "power might be exerted by courts and juries generally
to determine the reasonableness of an established rate," and "it would follow that unless all
courts reached an identical conclusion, a uniform standard of rates in the future would be
impossible." Id. See generally 4 KENNETH C. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 22:1-
:11 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing primary jurisdiction).
" KENNETH C. DAVIS, AmIsm'RTnm LAW TEXT § 19.01 (3d ed. 1972).
17 In the federal context, for example, Harrington v. Moss, 407 A.2d 658 (D.C. 1979),
provides support for invoking primary jurisdiction in a case involving the workers' compen-
sation jurisdictional issue. The court stated that
[g]iven the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must defer to administrative agen-
cies for the initial resolution of issues that Congress has placed within the special com-
petence of the agency or that otherwise require the expertise of administrative discre-
tion. In this way, courts can assure uniform application of a statute and deter those
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upon motion of a party advances the interest in uniformity that
underlies the primary jurisdiction doctrine. The board would de-
cide practically all cases in which there was doubt about whether
to apply tort law or workers' compensation law, since employers
would have an incentive to ensure that the board makes the deci-
sion in close cases. The workers' compensation laws would there-
fore be applied uniformly, and the board could apply consistently
the two-step inquiry as to employee status and whether an injury
occurred in the course of employment.6
The agency expertise rationale for primary jurisdiction also
supports this proposal.69 This rationale recognizes that administra-
who would flout the administrative process (and thus weaken the agency's effective-
ness) by encouraging people to ignore its procedures.
Id. at 661 (citations omitted).
68 Although this proposal might be seen as giving the boards too much control over the
jurisdictional inquiry, the inevitable reply is that workers' compensation statutes represent
a delicate and complex compensatory scheme which balances the interests of employers and
employees. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text. The proper route for modifying
these laws, given their stated purpose of establishing an exclusive remedy for injured em-
ployees against their employers, is within the legislative process. As one state court has
argued:
"But where the applicability of the Act is in real dispute and where the evi-
dence ... is not so overwhelming as to pass from a disputed question of fact to an
unalterable legal conclusion, does the circuit court have jurisdiction to make factual
findings determinative of the issues even in a suit brought before it originally or should
it refuse to accept jurisdiction until the Commission has acted? If in such situations,
the circuit court accepts all such cases brought before it and attempts to act with final-
ity when the issue of jurisdiction is raised, is it not assuming concurrent jurisdiction
with the Commission and in essence nullifying the legislative intent and enactment
which placed exclusive original jurisdiction with the Commission?"
Hannah v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 633 S.W.2d 723, 727 (Mo. 1982) (quoting Sheen v. Dibella,
395 S.W.2d 296, 303 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965)); see also O'Rourke v. Long, 41 N.Y.2d 219, 228,
359 N.E.2d 1347, 1354, 391 N.Y.S.2d 553, 560 (1976) ("The Legislature has placed the re-
sponsibility for these determinations with the Workmen's Compensation Board and there it
must remain.").
In 1972, the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws issued a
report that might be used as the basis for legislative modification. The Commission found
that workers' compensation plans "in general are inadequate and inequitable." NATIONAL
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 119. The report listed five objectives of workers' com-
pensation laws: (1) broad coverage of employees and work-related injuries and diseases; (2)
substantial protection against interruption of income; (3) provision of sufficient medical care
and rehabilitation services; (4) encouragement of safety; and (5) effective delivery of benefits
and services. Id. at 117-19. However, the Commission rejected such alternatives as a return
to civil damage actions or absorption of workers' compensation by social security, and in-
stead recommended that the essential elements of workers' compensation include increased
maximum benefits, virtually universal employee coverage, more coverage for occupational
disease, and continuation of payments during disability for life. See id. at 16 (tabulations of
recommendations).
69 The agency expertise rationale for primary jurisdiction emerged in Great N. Ry. v.
Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922), and United States v. Western Pac. R.R.,
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tive agencies may be "better equipped than courts [to decide cer-
tain issues because of] specialization [and] insight gained through
experience. When courts are confronted with problems within
an agency's area of expertise, they should take advantage of the
special contributions that the agency can make to solving those
problems. 71 Similarly, courts considering employee injury cases
should take advantage of the boards' special competence. Compen-
sation boards only hear employee injury cases, and they hear
thousands of these cases per year.72 Accordingly, they are exposed
to a wide variety of both employer-employee relations and employ-
ment duties. This exposure allows for more refined factual distinc-
tions in cases where the issues of employee status and course of
employment are not readily apparerit.
By assuring each party the opportunity for board determina-
tion of the jurisdictional question, this proposal cures the problems
associated with the current approaches-it advances the goal of
uniform decisions, eliminates the possibility of wasteful duplicative
litigation, and ensures that courts will take advantage of board
strengths.
CONCLUSION
As damage awards in tort cases continue to rise, victims of
work-related accidents will increasingly attempt to recover for
their injuries in a common law court rather than through the work-
ers' compensation system. Although these attempts indicate dissat-
isfaction with the amount of recovery available under workers'
compensation laws, it would be a mistake to conclude that they
also show dissatisfaction with the basic goal of workers' compensa-
tion law-providing a "certain and speedy" recovery for injured
workers. The problem of whether boards or courts should decide
the jurisdictional question is currently a source of considerable dis-
agreement. This comment's proposal-that boards decide the juris-
dictional question upon petition of either party-ensures that
352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956). For a discussion of efficiency grounds as the justification for a sepa-
rate administrative tribunal for workers' compensation claims, see W. MALONE, M. PLANT, &
J. LITTLE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS 400-
01 (2d ed. 1980); see also COMPENDIUM, supra note 1, at 34-35.
70 Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 575 (1952).
71 K. DAvis, supra note 66, § 19.01.
72 From 1969 through 1980 there were 500,000 claimants in black lung compensation
cases alone. UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ANALYSIS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
LAWS 1984, at 2. In 1981, workers' compensation payments in the United States totaled
$15,000,000,000. Id. at viii.
278 The University of Chicago Law Review
workers' compensation laws will continue to provide such a "cer-
tain and speedy" system for resolving the claims of injured
workers.
Daniel Keating
